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I.

I NTRODUCTION

Non-compete agreements can be traced back to British courts of
equity that sought to balance an employer’s interest in protecting his
investment in an employee against an employee’s interest in career
mobility. 1 As employment conditions changed over time, the laws
governing these covenants evolved to sustain this balance. Yet, Oregon’s
new law, which mandates an employer’s compliance with complicated 2
requirements for the enforcement of non-compete agreements in the
broadcasting industry, advances neither this traditional goal nor an
innovative set of objectives. Rather, legislative history reveals the
complexity of the statute is attributable to a legislature’s unsuccessful
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the Common Law Governing Post-Employment Non-Compete Contracts for Media
Employees, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1073, 1078-79 (2007).
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attempt to accommodate inconsistent goals of various political players:
state senators, the technology industry, broadcasting employers represented
in part by the Oregon Association of Broadcasters (OAB), and Oregon
broadcasters represented in part by the American Federation of Television
and Radio Artists (AFTRA). 3 While policy goals are the basis for these
equitable agreements, the conundrum is that this law does not adequately
further any such goals. As a result, employers will now craft noncompetition agreements to comply with the law, but their compliance will
inadequately balance the interests of broadcasting employers and
employees. A return to the common law tradition, however, would redress
this problem.
To demonstrate that this law does not comport with any set of policy
objectives, this Comment first explains the traditional goals of noncompete agreements by tracking their history from English common law to
American common and statutory law. An explanation of legislative
history, demonstrating the lack of a new set of policy objectives, follows.
This explanation includes descriptions of the previous legal regime and
Oregon’s political atmosphere, the publicized version of the law’s
implementation, events not covered by the press, and the major players
involved in the law’s codification. 4 The Comment concludes by exploring
the potential effects and shortcomings of the law vis-à-vis the broadcasting
industry.
II.

THE EVOLUTION OF NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS

A.

The Birth of Non-Compete Agreements in England

Non-compete agreements originated in England, 5 where they were
born out of a need to balance the interests of masters and their apprentices. 6
This employment relationship was intended to be mutually beneficial: a
master of a trade invested time and effort in training his apprentice 7 and the
3. Telephone Interview with James Dominic Monahan, Managing Partner, Luvaas
Cobb P.C., in Eugene, Or., General Counsel, the Oregon Association of Broadcasters (Jan.
3, 2008) [hereinafter Monahan] (noting that there were so many interests involved in the
formation of the law that this case demonstrated that there are “two things you never want to
see made: law and sausage”).
4. An examination of legislative history is difficult here because legislative records are
incomplete and the narratives of participants in the political process are occasionally
inconsistent with both each other and the record. Rather than create a fiction of legislative
history by synthesis, I attempt to ensure the integrity of this Comment by explaining the
legislative history through the record, and then through the lenses of political participants.
5. William Lynch Schaller, Jumping Ship: Issues Relating to Employee Mobility in
High Technology Industries, 17 LAB. LAW. 25, 28 (2001).
6. Packer & Cleary, supra note 1, at 1078-79.
7. Id.
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apprentice provided services of the trade for his master in return for his
education. In practice, however, this dynamic was fundamentally flawed.
As soon as an apprentice learned the trade secrets developed by a master,
he could leave his master, establish a competing business or work for a
competitor, and use these secrets to run his former master into financial
ruin. As a result, the masters began to issue covenants precluding an
apprentice from directly competing with them. 8
In time, English common law developed other restraints on employee
mobility. For instance, employees had to complete their work or risk
criminal prosecution. 9 These contracts placed a heavy burden on
employees who, due to a lack of “inter-craft mobility,” 10 virtually became
indentured servants of their employer.
English courts soon reined in the scope of the agreements, thereby
restoring the balance between the interests of the employee and employer.
For instance, in 1711, English courts began to distinguish between and
enforce only some types of restraints: namely, an employer could only
enforce a reasonable limitation. 11
B.

The Development of Non-Compete Laws in America

American common law initially adopted the reasonableness test first
developed in England. 12 As social norms and attitudes changed, so too did
the law governing the employment relationship.
With the onset of the American Revolution, the Civil War, and the
Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on slavery, the acceptability of indentured
servitude faded and judicial reluctance to enforce these covenants grew. 13
Soon, employees were freed from some of the traditional restrictions on
their mobility. 14 “Still, the last vestiges of these [relatively extreme] laws
did not disappear until the Supreme Court’s 1944 decision in Pollock v.
Williams, which struck down labor contract statutes that criminalized
employee fraud in failing to start work or in quitting before an agreed
term’s end.” 15
While non-compete agreements survived these cultural and legal
shifts, courts have been uncertain as to how the common law should change
8. Id.
9. Schaller, supra note 5; Packer & Cleary, supra note 1, at 1080.
10. Packer & Cleary, supra note 1, at 1080.
11. Id. at 1081-82.
12. Id. at 1082.
13. Schaller, supra note 5, at 28; see also Am. Broad. Cos. v. Wolf, 420 N.E.2d 363,
402 (N.Y. 1981).
14. Schaller, supra note 5, at 29 (noting that the Anti-Peonage Act of 1867 prohibited a
state from criminalizing nonperformance of an employment contract).
15. Id. at 29 (footnote omitted).
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to reflect new norms. 16 Consequently, court opinions, although aggregately
institutionalizing at-will employment, have “followed a relatively random
path and offered differing rationales.” 17
As Kathryn J. Yates contends, judicial confusion may be partially
attributable to the fact that multiple bodies of law impact these covenants. 18
For instance, a court may focus on the fact that a non-compete agreement is
a restraint of trade. 19 Then, the court will either adopt a reasonableness test
or analyze the covenant’s “at-will nature.” 20 Because non-compete
agreements are written in contract form, they are subject to contract law
and require adequate consideration. 21 However, they are also based upon
the more stringent law of equity, as employers often seek injunctive
relief. 22 A court of equity may be more concerned with the over-arching
fairness of its decision. 23
C.

Non-Compete Laws Today

Currently, the consensus is that non-compete agreements are subject
to a reasonableness test. 24 Specifically, these agreements must be: “(1)
ancillary to a valid existing employment contract or, alternatively,
separately supported by adequate consideration; (2) specific as to time and
territory; (3) necessary for protection of the employer’s legitimate business
interests; and (4) neither unduly harsh toward the employee nor injurious to
the public.” 25 Litigation arises when an employer seeks to enforce a
covenant or an employee seeks to escape one. Each component of the
reasonableness test serves to balance the employer’s interest in protecting
his investment in an employee with the employee’s interest in an ongoing
16. Norman D. Bishara, Covenants Not To Compete In A Knowledge Economy:
Balancing Innovation From Employee Mobility Against Legal Protection for Human
Capital Investment, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287, 295 (2006) (“While the corporate
world has been forced to adjust to (or perhaps embrace) the new employment dynamic of
highly skilled, mobile workers, the law has been slow to develop any overarching rules to
regulate changing aspects of the employment relationship.”) (footnote omitted).
17. Schaller, supra note 5, at 29.
18. Kathryn J. Yates, Comment, Consideration for Employee Noncompetition
Covenants in Employments At Will, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 1123, 1125 (1986).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1126 (citing the former Oregon law as an example of a limitation on
restrictive covenants).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1126-27.
23. Id. Alternatively, Courts now may use “negative enforcement,” which also requires
that the services rendered to the competitor are “unique or extraordinary”; and, because of
the unique nature of these services, an unenforced restrictive covenant will result in
irreparable harm to the employer. Am. Broad. Cos., 420 N.E.2d at 402-03.
24. Yates, supra note 18, at 1125.
25. Id. (footnote omitted).
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career. 26
The first requirement addresses “a concern for the average individual
employee who as a result of his unequal bargaining power may be found in
oppressive circumstances.” 27 If the covenant is included in an initial
employment contract, the employee can either refuse to work for an
employer requiring this contract and/or negotiate other employee benefits
in exchange for acquiescence to this agreement. If the employee is already
working when presented with the covenant, he trades any future
infringement on his career opportunities for fair consideration. 28
In some jurisdictions, continued employment is sufficient
consideration, especially if there is “the possibility that the employee would
otherwise have been discharged, the employee was actually employed for a
substantial time after executing the contract, or the employee received
additional compensation or training or was given confidential information
after he signed the agreement.” 29 In other jurisdictions, the employee must
receive significant consideration in order to avoid “a danger that [these
agreements are used where] an employer does not need protection for his
investment in the employee but instead seeks to impose barriers to prevent
an employee from securing a better job elsewhere.” 30
As with common law, the scope of the contract must be reasonable as
to time and place. This requirement provides safeguards to an employee in
that an employer must “prove the social utility of what [is a reasonable
restriction] . . . [and] permit judicial redrafting in the event the employer is
unsuccessful in doing so.” 31

26. See Boisen v. Peterson Flying Serv., Inc., 383 N.W. 2d 29, 35 (Neb. 1986) (“A
covenant not to compete, as a partial restraint of trade, is available to prevent unfair
competition by a former employee but is not available to shield an employer against
ordinary competition.”).
27. See Bennett v. Storz Broad. Co., 134 N.W. 2d 892, 899 (Minn. 1965).
28. See generally Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts And Worker Mobility:
The Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power Via Standard Form Noncompetes, 2006 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 963, 969-73 (2006) (noting that the reasonableness test rests on the assumption
that the employee can bargain with the employer).
29. Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies, 298 N.W. 2d 127, 130 (Minn. 1980)
(citation omitted).
30. Id. (citation omitted); see also Bennett, 134 N.W. 2d at 899 (“I[t] may well be
surmised that such a covenant finds its way into an employment contract not so much to
protect the business as to needlessly fetter the employee, and prevent him from seeking to
better his condition by securing employment with competing concerns. One who has
nothing but his labor to sell, and is in urgent need of selling that, cannot well afford to raise
any objection to any of the terms in the contract of employment offered him, so long as
wages are acceptable.”) (quoting Menter Co. v. Brock, 180 N.W. 553, 555 (Minn. 1920));
Boisen, 383 N.W. 2d at 34 (“‘[p]ost employment restraints are scrutinized with particular
care,’ and ‘[a] line must be drawn between the general skills and knowledge of the trade and
information that is peculiar to the employer’s business.’”) (citation omitted).
31. Arnow-Richman, supra note 28, at 969 (footnote omitted).
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Practically speaking, the reasonableness test is meant to ensure that
the employee’s decision to quit his job is not between unemployment or
another occupation (if the restricted area is so large as to make him
constructively unemployed, e.g., a non-compete that covers the entire
continent), a move outside the restricted area, or continued employment in
an unsatisfying job. 32 Instead, the employee chooses between the
inconvenience of finding a job outside of an area that is in direct
competition with the employer or staying with the current employer. Since
the employee had the opportunity to bargain at the time of the
commencement of employment for the receipt of fair consideration, he has,
in theory, already bargained for compensation for any inconvenience
caused by the foregone opportunity. 33
The agreement also must serve a legitimate business interest; ensuring
employee mobility is impaired only for a legitimate reason. 34 Finally,
because non-compete agreements originate in the law of equity, there is a
test for fairness. This serves as a catchall provision that permits the court
to be flexible to case-specific facts. 35
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A.

The Previous Oregon Non-Compete Law

The former Oregon statute attempted to balance competing interests of
the employee and employer by mostly “codify[ing] the basic common law
rules” of reasonableness. 36 Oregon courts imposed additional requirements
for enforcement, tipping the balance in favor of the employee’s interest in
mobility. In addition, the Oregon approach built in some degree of judicial
discretion in recognition that “the variety of employment situations make[s]

32. In King v. Head Start Family Hair Salons, Inc., the court altered the covenant
because it essentially forced the employee to choose between unemployment and switching
to an entirely different profession. Arnow-Richman, supra note 28, at 972 (discussing King
v. Head Start Family Hair Salons, Inc., 866 So. 2d 769 (Ala. 2004)).
33. See generally Arnow-Richman, supra note 28, at 969-73 (noting that the
reasonableness test rests on the assumption that the employee can bargain with the
employer).
34. Charles A. Carlson & Amy E. Stoll, Business is Business: Recognizing Referral
Relationships as Legitimate Business Interests Protectable By Restrictive Covenants in
Florida, 82 FLA. B.J. 49, 50 (2008) (investigating the legal limits of restrictive covenants in
Florida).
35. See Bennett, 134 N.W.2d at 899-900 (“The validity of the contract in each case . . .
must be maintained between the interests of the employer and the employee.”).
36. Kenneth R. Swift, Void Agreements, Knocked-Out Terms, and Blue Pencils:
Judicial and Legislative Handling of Unreasonable Terms in Noncompete Agreements, 24
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 223, 243 (2007) (discussing statutes pertaining to non-compete
agreements passed in several jurisdictions).

2009]

OREGON’S NEW NON-COMPETE AGREEMENT LAW

453

drafting specific limitations impossible.” 37
Oregon statutory law mandated that non-competes in any industry
were void unless “entered into upon the: (a) [i]nitial employment of the
employee with the employer; or (b) [s]ubsequent bona fide advancement of
the employee with the employer.” 38 Oregon courts did not take these
requirements lightly. In fact, Oregon courts reiterated that “[u]nder Oregon
law, the right not to be subjected to a non-competition agreement, except as
authorized . . . is an ‘important employment-related statutory right.’” 39
For instance, an employee had to receive “good consideration” in
exchange for signing the agreement. 40 Such consideration required that the
employee had to sign the agreement either in exchange for a subsequent
bona fide advancement or during the first day of work. 41
Thus, employers who claimed the agreement was signed upon
initiation of employment had to meet a stringent standard. Oregon courts
found that “the language of the statute . . . [was] an unequivocal statement
of public policy.” 42 In fact, “[a]ny non-de minimis delay, between the
commencement of employment and when the agreement was signed, [was]
fatal.” 43
The courts also rejected creative arguments meant “to circumvent this
restriction[, such as] arguing that a new term of employment begins each
day that an at-will employee comes to work.” 44 In these decisions, courts
noted that an agreement made between an employer and an employee
differs from “a contract negotiated between two businesses, or an
independent contractor, who may have greater leeway to establish their
own terms.” 45 Because an employee’s bargaining power may not be as
powerful as assumed by the traditional common law test, the covenant must
be signed when the employee has the most power to either walk away from
a new job or to negotiate the terms of a new job or advancement.
The requirements for an employer who argued in the alternative, that
the agreement was signed in exchange for a bona fide agreement, were
determined by the Ninth Circuit in Nike v. McCarthy “[b]ecause the
37. Id.
38. OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(1)(a)-(b) (2005) (amended 2007) (listing the
requirements for a noncompetition agreement under Oregon law).
39. Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. v. Am Office Prods., Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1160
(D. Or. 2001) (quoting Dymock v. Norwest Safety Protective Equip. for Oregon Indus., Inc.,
172 Or. App. 399, 405-06 (2001)) (expounding the bounds of Oregon noncompetition law).
40. Carey, infra note 51, at 143; see also Packer & Cleary, supra note 1, at 1087-88
(describing a case where an employment competition restraint was held valid in
consideration of installments of stock paid over the ten-year restraint period).
41. Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d at 1159-60.
42. Konecranes, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 2d at 1130 (citation omitted).
43. Id. at 1129 (citations omitted).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1130.
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Oregon Supreme Court had yet to construe the term” “subsequent bonafide agreement.” 46 That court found that, while the statutory language did
not provide guidance, the legislative history showed that a bona fide
advancement necessitated an increase in responsibility and improvement in
status, demonstrated by “new, more responsible duties, different reporting
relationships, and change in title and higher pay.” 47 Furthermore, it “held
that only when all of the elements of the advancement converged could an
employer obtain a non-compete agreement.” 48
In addition to these statutory requirements, an employer had to meet
each of the common law safeguards to enforce a covenant. 49 The courts
attributed the harshness of this rule to it being a “covenant in restraint of
trade,” the enforcement of which generally runs counter to public policy. 50
The first common law requirement was that the agreement mandate
temporal and geographical limitations. In its application, Oregon courts
uniformly held that any agreement spanning over two years was
unreasonable. 51 Furthermore, if the agreement was otherwise enforceable,
the courts changed unreasonable terms or, if absent, added “reasonably
limiting terms to contracts which [were] missing temporal or geographical
restrictive language.” 52
Second, the agreement “must be reasonable, meaning that, ‘it should
afford only a fair protection to the interests of the party in whose favor it is
made, and must not be so large in its operation as to interfere with the
interests of the public.’” 53

46. Daniel Hutzenbiler, Judicial Review of the Employment Relationship: An Overview
of Important Ninth Circuit Employment Law Decisions of 2004, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
551, 567 (2005) (footnote omitted) (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Oregon
law relating to non-compete agreements).
47. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Nike, Inc. v. McCarthy, 379 F.3d 576, 583 (9th Cir.
2004)).
48. Id. at 567-68 (footnote omitted).
49. Konecranes, Inc. v. Sinclair, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1130 (D.Or. 2004) (citing North
Pac. Lumber Co. v. Moore, 551 P.2d 431, 435 (Or. 1976)) (listing the three requirements
essential to the validity of a contract in restraint of trade).
50. Id.
51. Kristina L. Carey, Beyond the Route 128 Paradigm: Emerging Legal Alternatives
to the Non-Compete Agreement and their Potential Effect on Developing High-Technology
Markets, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 135, 143 (2001) (explaining the requirements for
enforcing non-compete clauses in Oregon); see also Packer & Cleary, supra note 1, at 1086
(noting that courts often “discuss the duration of the . . . agreement . . . in conjunction with
other variables”).
52. Carey, supra note 51, at 143 (footnote omitted); see also Packer & Cleary, supra
note 1, at 1086-87 (discussing cases in which five-year post-employment contractual
competition restraints were held unenforceable because they were unreasonable).
53. Olsten Corp. v. Sommers, 534 F. Supp. 395, 397 (D.Or. 1982) (citation omitted)
(quoting North Pac. Lumber Co. v. Moore, 551 P.2d 481, 435 (Or. 1976)) (listing the three
requirements needed to make a non-competition agreement valid).
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Just like in traditional common law, the court based its decision on
notions of fairness where an application of the law did not reach an
equitable result. For instance, if an employee signed a non-compete upon
starting work, the employee could not be held to a different one with the
same employer, even with a new contract. 54 The employer could also be
estopped from enforcing the covenant if, upon termination and in
enumerating the employee’s obligations post-employment, the employer
omitted mention of that agreement. 55 Moreover, if an employee signed a
non-compete with a company that merges with another, then the employee
is working for, and has no agreement with, a new company. 56
Courts also made a fact-based inquiry to ensure that these agreements
were enforced only where there was a legitimate business interest. For
example, courts were more likely to enforce an agreement restricting use of
“goodwill and inside information” than “barring a former employee from
competing altogether. The latter . . . is contrary to the public interest, and
makes it difficult for the employee to pursue his livelihood.” 57
B.

Oregon’s New Law
1.

The Political Atmosphere that Birthed Oregon’s New Law

The Oregon legislature replaced the previous law that was in
alignment with traditional policy objectives with one that was not. Why
would the state legislature implement these changes? How did it pass this
new legislation? Simply put, the law was a product of Oregon’s political
environment, which made its legislature particularly susceptible to
compromise labor legislation.
The Oregon legislature is unique for two reasons. First, it is not
Second, the atmosphere is frequently
saturated with lobbyists. 58
59
As a result, “it doesn’t take that many
characterized as “collegial.”
people to get something written [or] changed . . . . Unfortunately, [the
Oregon legislature passes] a lot of legislation that isn’t very picked at and

54. Pacific Veterinary Hosp., P.C. v. White, 696 P.2d 570, 570 (Or. Ct. App. 1985)
(holding void a more stringent noncompetition agreement in a third employment contract
where the first employment contract already contained a noncompetition agreement).
55. Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d at 1161-62.
56. Miller v. Kroger Co., 82 Fed. App’x 557, 559 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a noncompete agreement negotiated with an employer in contemplation of a merger does not fall
under the initial employment requirement).
57. Konecranes, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 2d at 1131.
58. Telephone Interview with Seth Row, Associate, Holland & Knight LLP (Jan. 8,
2008) [hereinafter Row] (discussing the role of non-compete agreements in Oregon).
59. Row, supra note 58.
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[is subject to] last minutes changes.” 60 So, in this case, where strong
interest groups charged in to make changes to the proposed legislation at
the last minute, the legislature yielded to their inconsistent demands, and
produced this new law.
In addition, there were circumstances that were unique to the time of
the legislative debate that prompted the introduction of a proposal for a
new non-compete law. “Democrats had a majority in both chambers,
[although] labor [would have] a lower success rate in the Senate than [in]
the House.” 61 In addition, the public was attuned to labor interests. So,
representatives were keenly aware that any vote on a bill pertaining to labor
interests might play a role in their reelection. Some constituents believed
that “the ‘special’ interests of unions went arm-in-arm with the wider
public interest.” 62 Others did not look fondly upon unions wielding such
power and viewed them as unwelcome lobbyists. 63 Therefore, “media
speculation about labor getting whatever it wanted [may have] hurt labor
because it made some Democrats wary of Republican attack ads that might
later portray them as union stooges.” 64 Thus, the spotlight was on labor
issues at the time of the bill’s enactment.
Under the former Oregon law, not many non-compete agreement
disputes made it to trial in Oregon. In fact, political players could only
remember enough to “count them on one hand.” 65 The absence of
litigation, however, did not translate into a lack of controversy.
Non-competes were “used very widely in situations in which most
legislatures [and] law professors . . . did not anticipate[,] . . . such as low
wage people in basically non-competitive industries[, and] in industries
where changing jobs is common.” 66 In addition, there was widespread
abuse of non-competes both “as a threat to constrain people’s ability to
change jobs [and against] people that didn’t have the sophistication to
know that it might not be enforceable to them.” 67
These circumstances caught the eye of Oregon’s Commissioner of
Labor, Dan Gardner. What he perceived as an inequitable situation
60. Id.
61. Don McIntosh, Legislature Bangs Gavel on Banner Year for Oregon Labor,
NORTHWEST LAB. PRESS, July 6, 2007, at 1, http://www.nwlaborpress.org/2007/7-607Salem.html.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Monahan, supra note 3; see also Kenneth J. Vanko, “You’re Fired! And Don’t
Forget Your Non-Compete . . .”: The Enforceability of Restrictive Covenants in Involuntary
Discharge Cases, 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 1, 2 (2002) (“The law in this area is relatively
undeveloped, perhaps because so few termination cases have made their way through the
reported decisions or the courts have not given them much reasoned analysis.”).
66. Row, supra note 58.
67. Id.
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motivated him to assume the role of the “driving force behind [the new
bill].” 68 Furthermore, political aspirations may have played a part in
advocating for this high-profile, labor-friendly position. The bill would
also have the effect of rallying support for the Democratic Party. “The idea
was that [Gardner] thought it would be a great move forward for the
Democratic Party in Oregon . . . because [non-compete agreements] are
viewed as the albatross around the neck of the working man.” 69
The circumstances seemed ideal to pass this legislation. First,
Gardner appeared to be a qualified lobbyist. He “[had] some sway with
Democrat[ic] leaders in Salem, if only because he served with many of
them before being elected to the labor commissioner position.” 70 Second,
the timing was right. In the past, there had been “a couple of
[unsuccessful] runs earlier in legislative sessions” to restrict these
covenants. 71 Now, however, the neighboring state of California had
prohibited non-compete agreements, so Gardner believed that he would
have the momentum to succeed this time. 72
2.

The Development of the New Law

The bill started as a relatively straightforward prohibition against noncompete agreements where the employer terminated his employee. Yet,
the bill would catch the attention of special interest groups who worried
about its application, but relished the opportunity to codify into law an
exception for their industry. 73 As a result, the bill grew more complex and
ineffective as it ping-ponged back and forth between the House and Senate.
On January 9, 2007, the House voted for House Bill 2257. The bill
voided any non-compete agreement if “the employee [was] laid off by the
employer.” 74 Laid off was defined as:
[P]ermanent termination . . . for reasons that are beyond the
employee’s control and that do not reflect discredit upon the
employee [including] . . . . the elimination of the employee’s
position, a lack of available funding or work, a reduction in the
size of the workforce and changes in the workplace that affect

68. Monahan, supra note 3.
69. Id.
70. Non-Compete Bill Appears on Way to Final Passage, WHAT’S HAPPENING AT THE
OAB? THE WEEKLY UPDATE FROM YOUR OAB OFFICE, (Oregon Ass’n of Broadcasters,
Portland, Or.) May 8, 2007, at 6.
71. Monahan, supra note 3.
72. Id.
73. The role of these special interest groups is further explored in Part III(B)(3) of this
Comment.
74. H.R. 2257, 74th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007).
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staffing needs. 75
This version carved out an important exception. Under this bill,
during an economic downturn, an employer has to effectively pay, in the
form of the employee’s wages, to protect his investment or release the
employee from the covenant. If the situation were otherwise and an
employer could terminate the employee and still enforce the covenant, an
employee would face some unappealing choices, such as learn a new skill,
move, commute outside of the restricted area, or remain unemployed,
without having committed any wrong. This amounts to a reasonableness
test that tips in favor of employee mobility.
However, this was not the version that was enacted. On January 12,
2007, the Senate expanded the definition of being “laid off” to “discharged
or laid off by the employer for a reason other than misconduct connected
with work.” 76 Gardner advocated this version as a better balance of
interests than the previous law. He claimed that enforcement of a covenant
where the employee was of no further use to an employer in a broad set of
circumstances was an inequitable restraint on employee mobility. Gardner
told one newspaper: employers “‘didn’t need their services anymore but[,]
either through legal action or industry action[,] (the noncompetes) are being
enforced . . . . [T]hese employees] have to go find a job in a different
industry or move out of the state.’” 77 He reassured employers that their
interests need not be protected by this type of covenant. Instead, they could
resort to “federal legislation [that] protects trade secrets and that would not
be changed by this legislation.” 78
Still, the OAB, representing employers of the broadcasting industry,
was worried that this bill would not protect their interests. In particular, it
was concerned about the meaning of “laid off” on two fronts. First, the
OAB anticipated that the ambiguity in the definition would cause a great
deal of litigation. 79 Second, it was wary of getting bogged down in
litigation over how each former employee departed from employment. In
the end, “[t]he OAB reviewed the new bill and determined that the
broadcast industry could live with the provisions, even though in a perfect
world, [they believed] non-competes would not be a subject worthy of
legislative consideration.” 80
75. Id. at §1(6)(C)(c).
76. S. 248, 74th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007). In addition, this bill required that
the employer either inform the employee of a non-competition agreement when extending
the job offer or upon a subsequent bona fide advancement. Id.
77. Bills Would Amend Noncompete Agreements For Laid-Off Workers, AP ALERT,
Apr. 7, 2007.
78. Id.
79. Id. (“Business interests, though, say [that] the definition of ‘laid off’ in proposed
legislation is vague.”).
80. What’s Happening at the OAB, supra note 70, at 5.
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While some major unions had yet to get involved at this point, some
labor lobbyists lent their voice in support of the provision on grounds of
fairness. 81 Yet, others vied for an all-out ban. The media, sympathizing
with the employee side, continued to drum up support by recounting
personal narratives of discharged employees. 82
On May 9, 2007, the Senate Interim Committee on Judiciary
continued to tweak the contents of the bill. As with past drafts, the
Committee wanted the covenants to be void “if the employee is laid off by
the employer for any reason other than just cause.” 83 The Committee also
decided to add more circumstances that would qualify as “laid off”: an
employee “is laid off due to an economic downturn” and the “employee is
not rehired by the employer within 90 days . . . in a position of the same
level.” 84 In addition, if the non-compete agreement did not satisfy all the
criteria for enforcement, the Committee created an unusual exception.
Namely, if otherwise enforceable, the court may uphold the agreement “if
the employer provides the employee full compensation at the level” of the
job from which he was terminated. 85
In the January 9 bill, an employee in this situation would not be
characterized as “laid-off” since the employee was not permanently
terminated. The January 12 version, permitting enforcement only where
there was misconduct, expunged that exception. The May 9 version
reinstated it, tipping the scales in favor of an employer. An employer could
escape having to pay in the form of wages, for a time at least, to enforce the
covenant during an economic slump.
The bill’s second change, permitting an employer to pay the
employee’s wages in order to enforce the agreement, could work for or
against either party, particularly in the broadcasting industry. It could be
argued that an employer would not pay this sum unless he truly wanted to
protect a business interest. However, name recognition and fame are
extremely important in the broadcasting industry. If an employer were to
pay this sum and keep a broadcaster off the air, the employer would
effectively diminish the employee’s good name and, as a result, ruin his
career. Additionally, a vindictive employer could destroy the employee’s
career without a showing of a legitimate business interest. Regardless of
81. Noncompete Agreements, AP ALERT, Apr. 8, 2007 (“[L]abor advocates say such
clauses are unfair to those who have been laid off against their will.”).
82. See, e.g., id. (recounting how a physical therapist found out after she was fired that
she could not perform similar work within sixty miles); Michael Lloyd, Bruce Womack Sr.,
Laid Off, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Apr. 29, 2007, at B1 (recounting how fired store manager
had to drive forty miles to new job in order to comply with old employer’s non-compete
agreement).
83. S. 248 Amendment, 74th Leg. Assem., (Or. 2007).
84. Id.
85. Id.
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these concerns, this version was not enacted.
Finally, on June 7, 2007, the Senate Interim Committee drafted the
version that would become law. As a preliminary matter, the law states
that non-competes are voidable and unenforceable in Oregon courts unless
they satisfy several requirements. 86 These requirements were far more
complicated than any previous version of the bill.
The first requirement is that the employee cannot be restricted from
working for more than two years from the date of termination. 87 If the
agreement stipulates a longer duration, “[the agreement] is voidable and
may not be enforced by a court of this state.” 88 Essentially, this provision
codified the common law already in place, which dictated that any
restriction over two years, in any factual scenario, was unreasonable.
Next, the agreement must be entered into in one of two ways: (1) the
employer informed the employee, in writing, that a non-compete is
required two weeks prior to commencement of work; or (2) the employer
offered a bona fide advancement, which includes both a raise and
additional responsibility, in return for signing the non-compete. 89
Third, the employee’s annual salary and commissions must be greater
than the median family income for a four-person family, as determined by
the United States Census Bureau. 90 Currently, that figure is about
$62,000. 91
Additionally, the employee must possess certain qualities. 92 The
employee must: “[perform] predominantly intellectual, managerial or
creative tasks; [exercise] discretion and independent judgment . . . [earn]
more than $650 per month on a salary basis . . . [and be] employed by the
United States.” 93
Likewise, there are requirements for the employer. Specifically, an
employer must have a protectable interest. 94 Ordinarily, a protectable
interest is one of two things. First, it could be a trade secret. 95 Second, it
could be “confidential business or professional information that otherwise
would not qualify as a trade secret, including product development plans,
product launch plans, marketing strategy or sales plans.” 96 Courts have a

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(1) (2007).
Id. at § 653.295(2).
Id.
Id. at § 653.295(1)(a)(A)-(B).
Id. at § 653.295(1)(d).
Richard Hunt, Commentary: New Non-Compete Rules Not Entirely Problematic,
DAILY J. OF COM., Jan. 18, 2007.
92. OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(1)(b) (2007).
93. Id. at § 653.020(3).
94. Id. at § 653.295(1)(c).
95. Id. at § 653.295(1)(c)(A).
96. Id. at § 653.295(1)(c)(B).
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longstanding history of protecting these types of secrets. Yet, the statute
also extended the definition to the context of broadcasting. In this type of
workplace, an employer has a protectable interest if: (1) the employee
works as on-air talent; and (2) the employer spends at least ten percent “of
the employee’s annual salary to develop, improve, train or publicly
promote the employee . . . on media that the employer does not own or
Yet, the broadcasting employer still cannot enforce a
control.” 97
protectable interest unless, when the employee is not permitted to work, the
employer pays the employee “the greater of compensation equal to at least
50 percent of the employee’s annual gross base salary and commissions at
the time of the employee’s termination or 50 percent of the median family
income for a four-person family, as determined by the United States
Census Bureau . . . .” 98
Finally, the statute included a catch-all provision. If the four-person
family salary and employee characteristic requirements are met, the
employer can enforce the covenant if, when the employee is restricted from
working, the employer pays the employee the greater of half of his salary
or half of a four-person family income. 99
The projected effects of this law on broadcasting employers and
employees are explored later in this Comment. However, the public
reaction to the law was that it was not sympathetic enough to the plight of
employees. The media peppered the news with poignant narratives of
broadcasters and of electricians. The electricians were not, under
traditional common law, intended to be covered by these agreements. 100 In
the most biting of articles, the media characterized the support behind the
bill as a “backlash . . . with critics accusing employers of abusing the
agreements and pursuing complaints against workers who have little to do
with intellectual property or who didn’t leave voluntarily.” 101
Notwithstanding public sentiments or the imperfections of the original
statute, the legislature changed a simple law which was easy to understand,
rooted in tradition, and tested over time to something incoherent. As
demonstrated below, the legislature permitted interest groups to steer the
formation of a new law. These changes resulted in a statute rampant with
requirements that fail to further any policy objectives.

97. Id. at § 653.295(1)(c)(C)(i).
98. OR. REV. STAT. at § 653.295(1)(c)(C)(ii).
99. Id. at § 653.295(6).
100. Brent Hunsberger, Noncompete Clause Filters Down from Executive Suite, SEATTLE
TIMES, June 24, 2007, at F3.
101. Id.
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The Interest Groups that Shaped the Development of the Law

Gardner’s original proposal only derogated from the law in that it
carved out an exception that would void the agreement if the employee was
“laid off.” 102 Therefore, his version protected a class of employees based
on their manner of parting with their former employer (as opposed to their
salary), the terms of enforcement of the restraint, the existence of a
protectable interest, and so forth. His bill was specifically targeted to
protect employees whose employer no longer wanted to have the employee
in his staff but did not want to permit the employee to work elsewhere. 103
This exception resonated with the common law tradition of enforcing
these agreements only when an employer had a protectable business
interest. If an employer did not find this employee valuable anymore and
terminated him or her, then this was an indication of a lack of an interest.
In addition, this bill could reduce abuse of non-competition agreements.
Employers in Oregon were issuing unenforceable non-compete agreements,
and employees who were unfamiliar with the law were binding themselves
to its terms to their detriment. 104 It would be easy to educate employees
about this clear-cut exception. In addition, codification of this bill seemed
feasible because the sympathetic narratives of terminated employees tended
to garner a lot of support from, and “[struck] a chord with[,] a lot of
legislatures.” 105
However, any potential for an easy implementation of the bill
dissipated as interest groups stepped into the mix. The bill was an
opportunity to advance not only local, but also national broadcasting and
technology industry interests on both the managerial and employment side.
In addition, on a local level, major advocates for the law “came from the . .
. electricians’ unions that were very frustrated at having non-exempt hourly
employees subject to them in an area where changing jobs was common
and didn’t think employers had a protectable interest.” 106
a.

The High-Tech Industry

On a national level, technology firms worried that the abolition of
non-compete agreements in California would start a national trend. It was
possible that a slippery slope of prohibition would gain momentum in the
102. Monahan, supra note 3.
103. Telephone Interview with Thomas Carpenter, General Counsel and National
Director of Legislative Affairs, American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, in
New York, N.Y. (Jan. 30, 2008) [hereinafter Carpenter].
104. Gruntled Employees, http://www.gruntledemployees.com (last visited Mar. 7,
2007).
105. Carpenter, supra note 103.
106. Row, supra note 58.
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Oregon legislature, which greatly influenced by that of California. 107 Less
established businesses were in favor of such a trend. “[S]tart-up companies
wanted to make it more difficult to enforce a non-compete because they
had trouble luring people away from big companies . . . .” 108 They
perceived the covenants as an undue, artificial restraint on the high
employee mobility of the high tech market. 109 In support of a ban, they
also pointed to the success of the Silicon Valley technology industry that
followed: “[the law] enable[d] employees to move more freely from firm
to firm and thus enhance[d] the likelihood of ‘spill over’ knowledge being
transmitted from firm to firm, with an overall net benefit to high tech
industries in the region.” 110
On the flip side, technology firms, such as the American Electronics
Association, were concerned that if every employee that was “laid off” 111
could escape a non-compete agreement, they would lose their trade secrets
to competitors. 112 They argued that while the industry as a whole appeared
to be thriving, individual companies were suffering. As Kristina L. Carey
observed in her article, “‘[p]rofitability turns less and less on building a
better mousetrap and more and more on formulating and protecting better
ideas, namely trade secrets.’” 113
Thus, legislative representatives in Oregon had to evaluate the impact
of a new non-compete law on the technology industry. In this process, they
had to decide whether to value the aggregate industry or “the success or
survival of the companies which make up the market.” 114
The final version of the new Oregon law did not derogate, in many
respects, from the previous regime governing non-compete agreements in
the high-tech industry. However, the involvement of these technology
107. See IKON Office Solutions, Inc. v. Am. Office Prod., Inc., 178 F. Supp.2d 1154,
1160 n.5 (D. Or. 2001) (citing California public policy in support of judicial reluctance to
enforce non-compete agreements). See generally Changes to Oregon’s Employment Laws
Leave Employers Asking: Is Oregon the New California?, The Pacific N.W. Employer
(Jackson Lewis LLP, White Plains, N.Y.), Winter 2008, at 2, 3, available at
http://www.jacksonlewis.com/legalupdates/newsletters/pdf/209.pdf (stating that while
Oregon’s legislation appears to enact sweeping changes, carefully crafted agreements
remain enforceable).
108. Row, supra note 58.
109. Schaller, supra note 5, at 25.
110. Id. at 31 (footnote omitted).
111. Monahan, supra note 3 (noting that high-tech companies were concerned about the
definition of the term “laid off”).
112. At Work, http://www.blog.oregonlive.com/atwork (last visited Mar. 5, 2007).
113. Kristina L. Carey, Beyond the Route 128 Paradigm: Emerging Legal Alternatives
to the Non-Compete Agreement and Their Potential Effect on Developing High-Technology
Markets, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 135, 136 (2001) (alteration in original) (footnote
omitted) (quoting John H. Matheson, Employee Beware: The Irreparable Damage of the
Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 145, 145 (1998)).
114. Id. at 137.
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firms drew media attention to the bill, attracting more interest groups that,
in turn, shaped the resultant law. 115
b.

The Broadcasting Industry

Gardner’s bill “did not start out targeted at broadcasters—it was
silent.” 116 That was surprising since, in Oregon, “the local media is very
prized.” 117
Also surprising was that non-compete agreements still
flourished in the industry with “considerably broader and longer
restrictions” than in other industries. 118 In fact, efforts to ban them by the
American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (AFTRA) had failed
in the past.
For instance, years before, “a small group of broadcasters in Oregon
had caught wind of a general law on non-competes that was flowing
through the legislature that wasn’t very specific to this industry. AFTRA
had developed model legislation that had been adopted in several other
states.” 119 The model legislation included a prohibition of non-compete
agreements between a broadcasting employer and an employee, aside from
those in sales and management. 120 The Oregon legislature, however, did
not incorporate AFTRA’s text into the law.
So, when news arrived of Gardner’s bill, the OAB pounced on the
opportunity to squash any further efforts to ban non-compete agreements in
the industry. The OAB “approached Mr. Gardner and [found that] he was
wholly unfamiliar” with the potential repercussions of the bill on the
broadcasting industry. 121
The OAB tried to convince Gardner to exempt the broadcasting
industry from the restriction on non-compete agreements. The OAB
argued that: (1) the broadcasting industry makes these broadcasters famous
by investing large sums of money in advertising and “should be able to
protect that investment;” and (2) broadcasters “make a lot of money,
they’re on T.V., . . . and therefore they don’t deserve the same type of
protections as those making middle income salary.” 122 In other words, the

115. Monahan, supra note 3.
116. Id.
117. Row, supra note 58 (“[T]he state loves their local news out there . . . . In Oregon
more so than other places.”).
118. Packer & Cleary, supra note 1, at 1075.
119. Carpenter, supra note 103.
120. Email from Thomas Carpenter, General Counsel and National Director of
Legislative Affairs, American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (Jan. 29, 2008,
11:12 EST) (on file with author) (attaching the Broadcast Employment Free Market Act)
[hereinafter Carpenter Email].
121. Monahan, supra note 3.
122. Carpenter, supra note 103.
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OAB argued that employers had a legitimate business interest and
employees have sufficient bargaining power.
When it became clear that a complete exemption had not garnered
enough support in the legislature, the OAB opposed any suggestion of a
salary floor for enforcement against broadcasters. What “bothered them
the most was that the non-compete clause was only going to be available if
they were paying the individual in excess” of the average salary, aside from
the relatively larger Portland, Eugene, Medford, and Bend markets. 123 In
short, the OAB perceived the salary floor as an effective ban on noncompete agreements.
After listening to their concerns, Mr. Gardner “wanted to make a
compromise that would exclude [broadcasting employers] from the
threshold income requirement provided that they were to invest [the
equivalent of] ten percent of their [employee’s] salary into promotion.” 124
Gardner’s suggestion was mostly well-received. 125
This new “bill had surfaced before [AFTRA was] even able to . . .
weigh in on it and the OAB was already mobilized.” 126 In fact, Thomas
Carpenter, the AFTRA National Director of News and Broadcast,
commented:
[B]y the time [AFTRA] got involved, it was pretty much a done
deal. The bill [had] caught [AFTRA] off-guard and by surprise.
In any other situation, [AFTRA] would have pulled [the] bill and
advocated model legislation but [its] local people were asleep at
the switch and [instead, AFTRA] got caught with a bill that
would have been damaging. 127
AFTRA immediately “coordinated with other groups and tried to
intervene to the extent that [it] could.” 128 It worked to avoid what their
model legislation was designed to prevent: a compromise that would do
more harm than good. Often these statutory compromises are comprised of
a salary cap, a termination exemption, and promotion as consideration. 129
Carpenter explained: “it makes for bad policy to agree to these
compromises. We find where we make compromises to a model language
it hurts other jurisdictions.” 130 Without any choice but to compromise,
AFTRA sought to ensure that employees in “the most egregious”

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Monahan, supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
Carpenter, supra note 103.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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circumstances were afforded protection. 131
AFTRA presented its key arguments in support of its contention that
broadcasters were in a unique situation where enforcement of these
agreements would be illegal and counter to public policy. First, it
purported that broadcasters did not have the bargaining power, an
underlying concern in traditional non-compete laws, to negotiate these
agreements. This was a result of the small number of both available on-air
broadcasting positions 132 and employers in the industry. 133 The number of
employers shrank further after the 1996 Telecommunications Act and the
Federal Communications Commission’s rules. 134
As a result, the covenants impose an “artificial ceiling on wages”
because, when renegotiating an expiring contract, broadcasters must decide
to accept lower wages, remain unemployed until the non-compete expires,
relocate outside of the designated area, or switch to an entirely new
career. 135 In contrast, those who do have bargaining power, like major
network broadcasters, do not have non-compete agreements. 136
Furthermore, unlike other industries, there is no employer interest
because a broadcaster is not privy to trade secrets or confidential
information. 137 Carpenter explained: “Our fundamental argument is these
people are not scientists with access to a secret formula or salespeople with
a secret customer’s list . . . .” 138 Instead, broadcasters offer their own
voice—which is not attributable to an employer’s investment. 139
AFTRA also characterized the employer’s advertising expenses of onair talent, not as an investment in training, but “simply a cost of doing
business.” 140 A manager’s investment rationale also lacks substance when
referring to employees who they do not publicize, like producers. 141 In
addition, “an employee's personality may have become popular for reasons
For instance,
other than the employer’s advertising efforts.” 142
broadcasters often exert great effort promoting themselves in public arenas
in order to become well-known enough to get an on-air position in the first

131. Id.
132. Cristin T. Kist, Comment, Blocked Airwaves: Using Legislation to Make NonCompete Clauses Unenforceable in the Broadcast Industry and the Potential Effects of
Proposed Legislation in Pennsylvania, 13 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 391, 395 (2006).
133. Carpenter Email, supra note 120.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Carpenter, supra note 103.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Kist, supra note 132, at 395.
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place. 143
Even when provisions in a non-compete agreement go are unlawfully
restrictive, an employee may not have the money or the time to fight
against enforcement because litigation may take longer than the span of the
non-compete. 144 Finally, AFTRA argued that Oregon should follow other
jurisdictions, like California, that have banned non-competes. 145
While AFTRA lobbied, it directed most of its time and effort toward
convincing one man, Senator Metsger, to lobby for the cause. He would
represent them in the legislative debate, but this was late in the game, and
the last-minute changes to the bill would simply inject more complexity
and confusion into the law.
c.

Senator Metsger

At the time AFTRA became involved, the Senate had already passed
the original version of the bill, which “did not provide a carve-out for
broadcasting.” 146 Then, in the House, the “OAB came in and . . . carved it
out as an exception” for the broadcasting industry. 147 That draft was
already submitted to two committees for consideration, and was on its way
to a joint committee 148 and “to the Senate for concurrence.” 149 At this
point, AFTRA stepped in.
Senator Metsger, who had only been involved in the amendments for
five days, sat on the joint committee. However, Metsger had personal
knowledge about the effects of a non-compete agreement on a broadcaster
because he had previously worked as an on-air broadcaster for KION-TV
in Portland and for a radio station. 150 Approximately three years into his
employment, an employer had asked him to sign a non-compete
agreement. 151 While he was not prohibited from working, Metsger, who
began his own communications business, believed the covenant was a
“limiting factor” in his career possibilities. 152 Still, others perceived
Metsger as someone who believed that “he was victimized about twelve
143. Packer & Cleary, supra note 1, at 1098 (citations omitted) (noting that in some
cases a court does not enforce covenants because “the court suspected that the employee
became successful through his or her own talents and efforts, not through the employer’s
efforts”).
144. Carpenter, supra note 103.
145. Id.
146. Telephone Interview with Rick Metsger, Oregon State Senator, D-Mt. Hood District
26 (Jan. 4, 2008) [hereinafter Metsger].
147. Metsger, supra note 146.
148. Monahan, supra note 3.
149. Metsger, supra note 146.
150. Id.; see also Monahan, supra note 3.
151. Metsger, supra note 146.
152. Id.
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years ago . . . and that was a sore point for him.” 153
Metsger understood the development of non-compete agreements in
the industry. He contended that the use of these covenants expanded
during the 1970s and early 1980s, because the news industry had recently
“discovered they could make money from [the news].” 154 Prior to that,
news was something they “had to do” as a public service. 155 Metsger
observed that covenants in the broadcasting industry became a standard
practice. 156 In his opinion, “the real injustice” was when an employer did
not desire to employ the individual (and so either did not renew the
employee’s contract or terminated him) but restricted his employment
nonetheless. 157 He believed that the widespread agreement in academia 158
supported his conclusion that this was an abuse of covenants. In support of
this contention, Metsger stated: “it’s really hard to make a case that [an
employee hired elsewhere] is really injurious to the employer and basically
keeping [the employee] out of [his] profession.” 159 Metsger believed that
because the broadcasting company insisted that there are many others who
would take the job position, he had felt “forced . . . to sign it because they
are threatening you with your career either now or later.” 160
AFTRA believed Metsger would be an ideal advocate for their cause.
A few years before, Metsger had tried to restrict the use of non-competes
but the committee head, a Republican, blocked it from reaching the floor.
161

When AFTRA contacted Metsger, he offered his support. 162
However, their interests were not completely aligned. 163 Metsger’s only
goal was to make sure that an employer could not enforce a non-compete
clause unless the employer compensated the employee. 164 Advocates for
the broadcasting industry were perturbed that Metsger “intervened at the
eleventh hour” to try to outlaw non-competes altogether. 165 Metsger
disagreed with that characterization: “I forced the issue and was successful

153. Monahan, supra note 3.
154. Metsger, supra note 146.
155. Monahan, supra note 3.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., Vanko, supra note 65, at 1 (“Strict considerations of fairness suggest that
it is antithetical to allow an employer to terminate an employee and prevent him from
working in his chosen profession.”) (emphasis omitted).
159. Metsger, supra note 146.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Monahan, supra note 3.
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in restoring/basically taking that exception back out.” 166
This success was not without struggle. Greg Macpherson, the
judiciary chair of the House, put the broadcasting exception in and “lobbied
[Metsger] hard because [he believed] it wouldn’t pass otherwise and
[Metsger] said bologna.” 167 Metsger cast aside Macpherson’s opinion that,
without this exception, the bill would fail. 168 Instead, Metsger believed that
the law would be unfair without addressing this issue, especially since there
were other “legal shackles” to protect employers, such as laws pertaining to
propriety information.” 169
As a result, Metsger “derailed the bill by moving not to concur
sending the bill to a joint House-Senate conference committee to deal with
The
provisions specifically related to the broadcast industry.” 170
conference produced a bill that mandated that employers pay half of an
employee’s salary while the employee was restricted from working for a
competitor. Although this may be characterized as a compromise, it
“effectively put a stop on non-competes with on-air talent in the [Oregon]
broadcasting industry.” 171 Yet, this version had a more robust vote from
the house and senate than before this exception. 172
Not everyone was pleased with the outcome. AFTRA wanted to start
from scratch, but believed “[t]his was the best [they] could do. 173 Metsger,
too, believed that a completely new bill would have threatened any
protection that this law provided; likewise, he preferred the confusing
language of this law. Metsger explained: “when you make too many
changes [to a bill], [you] risk at getting off track. I was willing to
compromise with any of their goofy percentages in order to make sure
[broadcasters] were broadly covered.” 174
Ironically, Metsger, by adding “goofy percentages,” became just
another participant who made “too many changes” to the law, stripping it
of its effectiveness.
IV. EFFECTS OF LAW
Aside from the timing requirements that were already in place, the
166. Metsger, supra note 146.
167. Id.
168. Id. (recounting that Macpherson advocated the position that it was better to “get
ninety-five percent of the apple rather than lose the whole apple”).
169. Metsger, supra note 146.
170. Conkling Fiskum & McCormick, Non-compete Bill Hits Snag, Bounces Back (June
26, 2007), http://www.cfm-online.com/pu_articleprintable.cfm?ArticleID=1211.
171. Monahan, supra note 3.
172. Metsger, supra note 146.
173. Carpenter, supra note 103.
174. Metsger, supra note 146.
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new law did not meet, let alone balance, the interests of employers and
employees in the broadcasting industry. Admittedly, the new law did help
codify the common law already in place. For example, it said that a
covenant not to compete spanning over two years is void, and that the
agreement must be entered upon commencement of employment or along
with a bona fide advancement. 175 Unlike the former Oregon law, a new
employee must now learn of the agreement two weeks prior to starting
employment. This boosts an employee’s bargaining power because an
employer can no longer surprise a new employee with the covenant on the
first day of work. Of course, this does infringe upon an employer’s interest
because the employer, who may need help immediately, must wait two
weeks for the employee to begin work.
The Oregon law that is now in effect also prohibits enforcement of
non-compete agreements against employees making the median family
income for a four-person family, 176 which is approximately $62,000. 177 As
of 2007, median news salaries nationwide did not reach that level. The
national median news salaries in television are: $60,000 for news anchors;
$53,300 dollars for weathercasters; $40,000 for sports anchors; $29,500
for news reporters; and $29,000 for sports reporters. 178 Compared to
Oregon figures, these numbers may be inflated due to the fact that
“[o]verall, salaries are highest in the Northeast and lower in the West.” 179
As of 2007, the median salaries in radio broadcasting are also below the
threshold: $25,000 for news reporters; $29,000 for news anchors; $30,000
for sports anchors; and $19,300 for sports reporters. 180
There are two potential consequences of this requirement, both of
which are detrimental to at least one side of the broadcasting industry.
First, this could serve as an effective ban on non-compete agreements for
the majority of employees earning below this amount. Employers clearly
are not amenable to this result. Secondly, the salary minimum may act as a
ceiling on wages for those earning above that figure, which is detrimental
to employees. The floor would then “essentially [be] putting a situation in
play where employers are still not going to pay employees fair value for
their services”; in short, there is “no incentive for employers” to pay other

175. OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(1)(a)-(b),(2) (2008).
176. OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(1)(d) (2008).
177. Hunt, supra note 91.
178. Bob Papper, Seize the Pay: As Newsroom Compensation Chases Inflation, Not
Everyone Is Able to Catch Up, According to the Latest RTNDA/Ball State University Survey,
June
2007,
at
16-17,
available
at
COMMUNICATOR,
http://www.rtnda.org/media/pdfs/communicator/2007/jun/062007-16-25.pdf.
179. Id.
180. Id.; see also id. at 22 (stating how broadcasters have voiced additional concern that
“radio salary increases during the past five years are only 40 percent of inflation”).
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employees more than that low floor. 181 Furthermore, a salary requirement
does not indicate, at least in common law tradition, that the employer has a
protectable business interest.
The next prerequisite for enforcement of the covenants is that the
employee must conduct “administrative, executive or professional work[;] .
. . [p]erform[] predominantly intellectual, managerial or creative tasks;
While
[and] [e]xercise[] discretion and independent judgment.” 182
employees that perform on-air are explicitly included in the statute, the
elusive language does not give guidance as to who else in the industry can
be subjected to an agreement. For instance, are producers performing
“creative” work? How far down the chain of production does the statute
apply, considering that many employees use “independent judgment”?
This will create uncertainty in the industry because even employees and
employers who are knowledgeable about their legal rights will have
difficulty entangling this mess.
The statute also stipulates that an employer has a protectable interest
in the employee, meaning that the employer spends money training or
advertising the broadcaster in media not owned by the employer, and the
employee works as on-air talent. 183 Employee interests are not met here
because neither advertising expenses nor training (such as public speaking
classes) necessarily gives rise to a legitimate protectable interest, like a
trade secret, under traditional common law. Moreover, non-compete
agreements are only intended for situations where the employee poses a
real threat to an employer’s business by potentially bringing secrets to a
competitor. Neither voice lessons nor billboards pose this type of threat.
In addition, the employer actually benefits from the additional advertising
expenses, further indicating that it does not give the employee additional
bargaining power.
Next, the employer must pay the employee greater than half of the
employee’s salary or the minimum income during the period that the
In fact, if some of the
employee is forbidden from working. 184
requirements are not met, but (1) the employee still earns the minimum
income and performs a job of certain characteristics, and (2) the employer
is willing to pay that same amount while the covenant is enforced, the
agreement is valid. 185 Like the minimum salary, this will either serve as a
salary cap or as an effective ban on these covenants “because employers
won’t want to pay them” while they are restricted from employment. 186
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Carpenter, supra note 103.
OR. REV. STAT. § 653.020(3) (2008).
OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(1)(c)(C)(i) (2008).
OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(1)(c)(C)(ii) (2008).
OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(6) (2008).
Row, supra note 58.
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Combined, these requirements are complicated and neither employees
nor employers will be able to predict, with certainty, whether they are
unenforceable.
Non-compete agreements, both enforceable and
unenforceable, were prevalent in 2007. 187 In that year, the number of noncompete agreements dropped from previous years, although it is uncertain
whether this decline will continue into the future. 188 Even so, the covenants
are still prevalent in the television industry: 89.7% of sports anchors,
89.3% of weathercasters, and 91.5% of news reporters are subject to a noncompete agreement. 189 The figures for radio are also high-90% of news
reporters, 70.6% of news anchors, 75% of sports anchors, and 100% of
sports reporters are under a non-compete agreement. 190 These statistics
reflect the belief that, unlike the management side of the industry, many
employees do not know that their agreement may be unenforceable. 191 The
complex nature of the new law increases the likelihood that employees will
have difficulty discerning their rights and assessing their bargaining power.
In addition, given the lack of litigation over these agreements, it is likely
that employees will not challenge an unlawful non-compete agreement.
Employers will suffer from this uncertainty too. Aside from its effects
on salary, the uncertainty of the law “certainly raised an awareness
amongst companies that you can’t take non-competes for granted [even if
they are within the bounds of the law because there are] so many ways to
challenge and get out of them.” 192
Following the law’s enactment, companies are trying to adjust in a
number of ways. Beginning in 2008, companies will enter into agreements
two weeks prior to an employee’s start date. 193 In addition, companies may
be resorting to other types of agreements covering trade secrets 194 and
solicitation. However, these contracts may not be sufficient to please
employers. For instance, while some attorneys are turning to nonsolicitation agreements for employees with lower wages, “there has to be a
great deal of legislation before [the legal community] understand[s] it.” 195
The ambiguous body of law has led to fears that if the solicitation
agreement is drafted “broadly so a court can construe it as a non-compete,
[the] court may void it,” especially in an industry where there are few
187. Papper, supra note 178, at 24.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Row, supra note 58 (discussing the common problem of employees not knowing
that their non-compete agreement with their employer was unenforceable).
192. Id.
193. Monahan, supra note 3.
194. Row, supra note 58 (discussing the California technology industry’s transition to
agreements based on trade secret law).
195. Id.
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customers. 196
Meanwhile, unions are pushing employers to adopt other “less
onerous means” to keep employees that do not “create unemployment or
compress salaries,” including paying what the market will bear for their
services (if that anchor is truly a valued employee); long term contracts;
contracts that have first negotiation rights (e.g., during last six months of
the contract, an employee will not talk to a competitor and will give his
current employer the first opportunity to reach an agreement). 197
V.

CONCLUSION

Non-compete agreements have a longstanding history—one that
clearly conveys the purpose of these covenants. The enforcement of noncompete agreements is limited to protecting a legitimate business interest,
but only when an employee’s mobility is not unduly burdened. However,
this new Oregon law does not balance these interests. Instead, the law, a
conglomeration of advocated requirements by interest groups, will be
detrimental to the broadcasting industry by affecting salaries, increasing
uncertainty in the law, and enforcing non-competes based on arbitrary
requirements rather than sound policy. Hopefully, this article will compel
the Oregon legislature to revisit this issue. After all, a non-compete law
should not just have the effect of placing burdensome restrictions on the
broadcasting industry, or any industry for that matter; it should be a
thoughtful attempt to aid both employers and employees, and in the
process, help the industry thrive.

196. Id.
197. Carpenter, supra note 103 (discussing routes an employer can take that provide
similar protections to a non-compete agreement yet reduce the burden on an employee).

